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Definitions and abbreviations 
 
B/L     Bills of Lading 
 
CIF     Costs, insurance, freight    
 
C/P     Charterparty 
  
Demurrage Liquidated damages. Been defined as “an agreed 
amount payable to the owner in respect of delay 
to the Vessel once the Laytime has expired, for 
which the owner is not responsible. Demurrage 
shall not be subject to exceptions which apply to 
Laytime unless specifically stated in the Charter 
Party.1   
 
FOB     Free on board 
 
JBL     Journal of Business Law 
 
L&D     Laytime and demurrage 
 
LMCLQ Lloyd’s Maritime & Commercial Law Quarterly 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 BIMCO: Laytime Definitions for Charter Parties (2013) clause 30, as published 10th 
September 2013. Earlier VOYLAYRULES 93.  
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Laytime Amount of time allowed in a voyage charter     
for loading and/or discharging operation 
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1. Introduction 
In every commercial sale the contracting parties will seek certainty2 when it comes to 
their rights and obligations under the contract. This is especially true for provisions 
concerning time and money, as these elements are generally considered to be of 
immense importance to commercial parties.3   
 
One of such obligations is the agreed laytime used for loading and discharge 
operations of the chartered vessel and the following liquidated damages4 in the form 
of demurrage if the laytime is exceeded. Such clauses are usually found in voyage 
charterparties, but a CIF seller or FOB buyer acting as charterer would be eager to 
pass on the risk of this cost to the other party under the contract of sale concluded on 
shipment terms. The reason being that they generally have no control over the 
discharge or loading process, respectively. It is important to emphasise that the risk 
here mentioned is in terms of carriage under the charterparty and not as the concept is 
perceived in international trade relating to the goods.    
 
The understanding on how to draft such clauses in order to make them work has 
immense financial importance for the parties involved because money turns on the 
wording of the clause if laytime is exceeded. The fine differences in wording have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See here Lord Bingham in The Starsin [2004] 1 AC 715 [13], quoting Lord 
Mansfield. Also Thomas D.R, The evolving law and practice of voyage charterparties 
(Informa Law, 2009) p. 175. 
3 See here also Sale of Goods Act 1979, S. 62 (2) which refers to the common law.   
4 Lord Dunedin held “the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted pre-
estimate of damage” in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co. 
Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
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implications on the construction and the very understanding of laytime and demurrage 
clauses in sale contracts.   
 
If the laytime and demurrage clause in the contract of sale is seen as an independent 
obligation regardless of the charterparty, the consequence is that demurrage might be 
payable under the sale contract but not under the charterparty itself, giving the other 
party a benefit, which might be regarded as unjustifiable.  
 
In addition, the two different provisions might provide terms that does not reconcile 
as to the period of laytime and amount payable as demurrage. There is also several 
issues relating to the commencement of laytime and the exceptions found in the 
charterparty. These problems are especially relevant when the clause makes a 
reference to or incorporates a rate from the charterparty, thereby strengthening the 
relevance of the charterparty in the construction.     
 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine how the authorities have construed laytime 
and demurrage clauses in the contract of sale and how one should draft such clauses 
in order to avoid making them payable when they are not under the charterparty. In 
addition, the dissertation will undertake to answer what nature and effect these clauses 
have and if the law of penalties can avoid making these clauses independent under the 
sale contract. The dissertation will use authorities from case law in order to determine 
where the law stands on these issues. The dissertation restricts itself to deal with 
laytime and demurrage clauses in contracts of sale under English Law and will 
therefore not deal with incorporation issues related to bills of lading or the many 
problems related to the calculation of laytime in charterparties.  
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1.2 Legal and commercial background: ‘Your delay is my cost’ 
Voyage charterparties or contracts of affreightment, are considered to be the 
governing contract between the shipowner and the charterer. The party that has 
undertaken to load and discharge the cargo may vary depending on the shipment 
terms used and obligations the parties have agreed, but the single most important 
factor for the shipowner under a voyage charterparty is the usage of time since other 
fixtures might be waiting. Time is therefore money and the shipowner or carrier is 
therefore eager to regulate this variable.   
 
The amount of time allowed in a voyage charter for the loading and discharge 
operation is therefore usually set out as laytime in the charterparty. If the time is 
exceeded, the vessel will then be on demurrage, which are liquidated damages for 
exceeding the agreed time at disposal. The demurrage provision therefore shifts the 
risk of delay onto the charterer, which is the closest party to regulate the loading and 
discharging process.   
 
This is the basis for the expression ‘your delay is my cost’ where the shipowner has 
no interest in covering expenses arising from delays he is not responsible for, nor has 
any control over. The shipowner therefore shifts the risk of delay onto the charterer, 
who in turn tries so shift it over to the CIF buyer or FOB seller under the sale 
contract. The charterparty usually exist because either party has to fulfill his 
obligation to transport the goods under the sale contract. The charterparty is therefore 
entered into by the charterer which can be either the CIF seller or the FOB buyer.5  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 There are several variation to this and the parties have the freedom to make any 
arrangements they may please.  
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Consequently, these laytime and demurrage clauses are found in charterparties 
between the shipowner and the charterer and traditionally not in contracts of sale 
between the seller and the buyer. Their natural habitat is therefore not within contracts 
of sale at all. This causes problems with their interpretation, construction and how 
they are to be regarded next to their counterparts in charterparties if there are any 
inconsistencies and especially if there is a reference to the charterparty itself. 
 
Firstly, what is the relationship between the two sets of clauses? Is the default position 
that they are free and independent or can they act as an indemnifying provision? This 
is especially relevant if the clause in the sale contract refers to the charterparty terms 
or incorporates a rate and there is an inconsistency between the clauses.   
 
Secondly, if they are regarded as free and independent, what does the usage of general 
words of incorporation or reference to the charterparty terms in the sale contract do 
towards their construction and interpretation? How is the exceptions under the 
charterparty to be understood and when does the laytime commence? 
 
And thirdly, if a cesser clause in the charterparty protects the charterer against 
demurrage costs under the charterparty, would it not be considered unfair that the 
seller can claim demurrage under the contract of sale even though no such costs have 
been incurred under the charterparty?6 And if not, would not the law of penalty strike 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This was the case of Suzuki & Co. v Companhia Mercantile Internacional (1921) 9 
LI.L.Rep 171 (C.A.) where it was held to be an indemnity clause. The idea that a CIF 
seller could take such a benefit of a cesser clause has later been described as 
‘unappealing’ in Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] 
EWCA Civ 822 [32].   
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down any possibility of claiming liquidated damages when no demurrage has actually 
occurred under the charterparty?  
2. Laytime and demurrage clauses in sale contracts 
2.1 Is the law on charterparties and bills of lading relevant for 
interpretation and construction? 
One of the most obvious answers to this is that charterparties and bills of lading quite 
simply operate under a different contractual regime than the sale contract, giving 
limited amount of relevance to sale contracts. It would therefore seem that the only 
possibility would be by way of analogy. The understanding of the laytime and 
demurrage provision as an incorporation clause will depend on the drafting of the 
clause itself and how many elements it relies on from the charterparty.  
 
The understanding will depend on the wording of the clause itself as a mere reference 
to the laytime an demurrage clause in the charterparty must be seen as a certain type 
of incorporation, at least of a rate if not more. If the view is taken that the laytime and 
demurrage clause is free and independent, it would also seem to be counter-
productive to regard the clause as a type of incorporation because one would then 
strengthen the linkage towards the charterparty to such a degree that it would seem 
natural to regard the clause as operating by way of indemnity. If the parties have 
agreed on a laytime and demurrage clause referring to the charterparty, the exact 
scope and wording of the clause must be assessed.       
 
One of the reasons for not applying the same principles is that the law of 
charterparties is highly developed, but its primary focus is on the ship, and not the 
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goods being carried.7 Consequently, the law of charterparties would, prima facie, not 
be able to aid the construction and incorporation of laytime an demurrage clauses 
since they deal with a different subject-matter entirely and therefore would seem not 
to relevant to the right and obligations of the parties under a sale contract which deals 
with the goods or commodity.     
 
However, there are cases where charterparty law has been used for the construction of 
laytime and demurrage clauses in contracts of sale. The restrictions from the 
charterparty regime applied mutatis mutandis to the laytime and loading rate under 
the sale contract in The Bonde.8 If the parties’ intentions is the ultimate aim of 
construction based on the language used,9 it could be asked if similar situations could 
aid such a construction.  
 
In general, incorporation from the charterparty by general wording into the bill of 
lading is effective as a general principle from the law of contract.10 There are however 
challenges with the identification of the charterparty,11 which terms that are 
incorporated12 and if the wording can be manipulated. The purpose is to make the 
receiver or bill of lading holder liable for freight, demurrage or other obligations.         
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Chuah J, Laytime and Demurrage Clauses in Contracts of Sale – A Survey of the 
New York Society of Maritime Arbitrators’ Awards (1978 – 2008) and English Case 
Law (Informa Law, 2009) at page 178.   
8 The Bonde [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135.  
9 Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 [14]. 
10 Treitel G, et al, Carver on Bills of Lading (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 3-014.  
11 See Pacific Molasses Co v Entre Rios CN. (“The San Nicholas”) [1976] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 8 and Partenreederei MS ”Heidberg” and another v Grovenor Grain and Feed 
Co. Ltd (”The Heidberg”) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 287.     
12 TW, Thomas & Co. Ltd v Portsea SS Co Ltd. (“The Portsmouth”) [1912] AC 1, 
where an arbitration clause was not found to be germane by The House of Lords.	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In The Miramar13 the House of Lords answered the question of manipulating the 
charterparty terms so that consignee became liable for demurrage negatively. The 
reasoning given was partly due to the fact that the consignee is “accepting blindfold a 
potential liability to pay an unknown and wholly unpredictable sum for demurrage”.14 
This point is also mentioned in other authorities.15 There is a similarity here towards 
the CIF buyer or FOB seller, which rarely will have any access to the charterparty 
terms as they are not charters and therefore an argument could be put forward that the 
same considerations and restrictive approach should be applied.      
 
The reasoning for applying charterparty law in The Bonde16 has been said to prevent 
the potential far-reaching implications the buyers argument had.17 It would seem far-
fetched that this argument itself would limit the precedence of the case. The case has 
been seen as “the most explicit example of a judicial tendency to apply to sale clauses 
the rules developed by the courts for the construction and application of laytime an 
demurrage clauses in charterparties”.18 The tendency can be explained by the close 
similarity towards charterparties and the problems that there arise. When a type of 
clause is taken out of its natural habitat and the law on this area is scarce, the 
understanding of the clause can be helped by looking at how it is perceived under the 
charterparty.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Miramar Maritime Corp v Holborn Oil Trading Ltd (“The Miramar”) [1984] AC 
676 [685].   
14 Ibid.  
15 A point made in Jindal Iron & Steel Co Ltd. V Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co. 
(”The Jordan II”) [2005] 1 WLR 1363 [25] by Lord Steyn.   
16 The Bonde [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135.  
17 Chuah J, Laytime and Demurrage Clauses in Contracts of Sale – A Survey of the 
New York Society of Maritime Arbitrators’ Awards (1978 – 2008) and English Case 
Law (Informa Law, 2009) at page 176.   
18 Debattista C, Laytime and demurrage clauses in contracts of sale – links and 
connections 2003 LMCLQ 508 at 523. 
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There are also several other examples from the authorities. The tendency to borrow 
from the law of bills of ladings has also shown itself when it comes to the 
incorporation of arbitration clauses into a retrocession contract.19 And “some 
assistance is to be derived from the general approach of the Courts” from cases 
concerning the incorporation from charterparties into bills of lading when it comes to 
the incorporation of a time bar clause into a sale contract.20 This has been followed up 
where the question was if the incorporation of charterparty terms into the sale contract 
was valid.21  
 
Thereby it could be argued that the law of charterparties concerning the incorporation 
into bills of lading can apply mutatis mutandis to incorporation of laytime and 
demurrage in contracts of sale. The situation can be said to be analogous to the 
incorporation of charterparty terms into bills of lading. 
 
However, this provides uncertainty for the parties to the sale contract because any 
exceptions might not be a part of the sale contract at all. The better view seems to be 
that it would be difficult to understand the nature of a laytime and demurrage clause 
in the sale contract as independent if exceptions under the charterparty apply to the 
contract of sale without being mentioned in the clause under the sale contract.     
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Excess Insurance Co Ltd v Mander [1997] 2 Lloyds Rep. 119. 
20 Judge Rix, as he then was, in OK Petroleum A.B. v. Vitol Energy S.A. [1995] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 160 [165]. 
21 Ceval Alimentos S.A. v Agrimpex Trading Co. Ltd (The “Northern Progress” No. 
2) [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 319 [330].  
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It is also tempting to draw a line towards general incorporation issues under contracts 
of sale regarding time bar provisions, arbitration clauses and jurisdiction clauses 
incorporated from charterparties. These situations can also be said to be analogous 
towards incorporation of demurrage clauses because the same issues of construction 
arise.     
 
There are several cases bearing resemblance to the incorporation issue. For instance 
the incorporation of a time bar relating to demurrage was answered negatively in OK 
Petroleum v Vitol Energy.22 The main reasoning being that the incorporation cannot 
be construed wide enough if the provision was not a part of the subject-matter of the 
contract and merely ancillary to it, and therefore not germane to the right and 
obligations of the parties.23 And the general incorporation of the whole of a 
charterparty was also answered negatively in The Northern Progress No.2.24    
        
Furthermore, if there is a cesser clause in the charterparty, one could argue that the 
liability for demurrage under the sale contract “flies in the face of commercial 
reality”25 so that it is unreasonable, the parties must make such an intention clear and 
if not it cannot be incorporated. It can therefore be suggested that there is some legal 
basis for applying the principles of construction as set out by the law of charterparties 
to sale contracts and that the benefits of doing so are several. Another question is how 
much commercial sense and certainty such a use of analogy would provide for the 
parties.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 OK Petroleum A.B. v. Vitol Energy S.A. [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 160.	  
23 OK Petroleum A.B. v. Vitol Energy S.A. [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 160 [168]. 
24 Ceval Alimentos S.A. v Agrimpex Trading Co. Ltd (The “Northern Progress” No. 
2) [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 319. 
25 Ceval Alimentos S.A. v Agrimpex Trading Co. Ltd (The “Northern Progress” No. 
2) [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 319 [330]. 
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On the other side, there are some considerable differences between these two types of 
contract. This is shown by the fact that the courts have been described as having a 
restrictive approach to the construction of general words incorporating charterparty 
terms into the bills of lading,26 partly due to the fact that charterparty terms contain 
elements not relevant between carrier and B/L holder and that it is not plausible that 
the parties intended such incorporation.27 The same reasoning applies to charterparty 
terms and the buyer and seller under a contract of sale, since these are also two 
different contractual environments. The terms of the charterparty are not material 
relevant towards a CIF buyer or FOB seller and it would therefore seem too remote to 
use these cases by way of analogy and a restrictive approach should in the view of the 
author be used. In addition to the fact that the subject matter is different, it would 
seem difficult to the parties under a sale contract to be certain of their rights and 
obligations if the exceptions under the charterparty might apply to the sale contract.     
 
Furthermore, several authors have expressed the view that the “stricter rule” which 
governs incorporation of charterparty terms into bills of lading does not apply to 
contracts generally.28 It has also been pointed out that a laytime and demurrage 
provision might refer to or incorporate from a charterparty, but that the provision 
itself is in an otherwise independent sale contract regime.29 It is therefore submitted 
that since these are two different contractual regimes, which deals with different 
subject-matters, the better view seems to be that one cannot in general rely on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Treitel G, et al, Carver on Bills of Lading (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 3-014. 
27 Ibid.	  
28 See Treitel G, et al, Carver on Bills of Lading (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 3-
015.  
29 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[42, vi].   
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charterparty law to solve issues on laytime and demurrage clauses in sale contracts.  
The most important difference being the disparity in the function and materiality of 
the two different contracts.    
2.2 Construction: indemnity or individual clauses? 
A good starting point as to interpretation of contractual terms is found in The Rainy 
Sky,30 where the Supreme Court held that the ultimate aim is to determine what the 
parties meant by the language used by ascertaining what a reasonable person would 
have understood the parties to have meant. Furthermore, a “relevant reasonable 
person is one who has all the background knowledge which would reasonably have 
been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the 
contract”.31  
There should be no apparent reason why the same principles of interpretation should 
not be applied to laytime and demurrage provisions in contracts of sale, as these are in 
fact provision found in the same type of contract. Since the charterparty terms often 
are drawn up after the sale contract is concluded, it must be kept in mind when 
construing a sale contract term, that the background knowledge of the parties might 
be limited.  
In The Suzuki32 the Court of Appeal held that a CIF contract stating “demurrage as per 
charter-party or freight agreement” should be construed as a contract of indemnity 
based on the language used and consequently the appeal was dismissed. The judge 
also pointed out that an obligation to pay demurrage irrespective of the sellers 
obligations was an addition to the price paid and “one does not quite see why the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50. 
31 Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 [14].  
32 Suzuki & Co. v Companhia Mercantile Internacional (1921) 9 LI.L.Rep 171 (C.A.).	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parties should enter into such a contract”.33 The point made is a valid one as one of 
the physical duties of a CIF seller is to ship or procure a shipment of goods in 
accordance with the contract and thereby procure the proper shipping documents to 
the buyer.34 In other words the buyer pays for, among other things, to avoid the 
undertaking and risks of being held accountable for demurrage to the shipowner. It 
would seem not to make any commercial sense that a CIF buyer would enter into a 
sale contract undertaking responsibility for liquidated damages without, most likely, 
knowing the rate. And in addition, to be accountable for demurrage under the contract 
of sale even though no demurrage has incurred under the charterparty. This paradox is 
even more visible when the incorporation is seen from the view of the FOB seller 
since he does not have anything do to with the goods as soon as they are shipped at 
the port of loading.      
If the development is a tendency that the CIF seller (charterer) discharges liability 
under the charterparty and shifts the risk towards the CIF buyer, the buyer might be 
better off concluding the sale contract on FOB shipment terms so that he is in full 
control of the charterparty terms himself and able to make the now FOB seller liable 
for demurrage at the loading port.  
Taking these observations into account, the better view would seem to be that the 
words “Demurrage as per charter-party” should be construed as being an indemnity, 
making it payable at the respective rate only if it is actually payable under the relevant 
charterparty. However, the developments from the authorities suggest otherwise.        
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Lord Justice Bankes in Suzuki & Co. v Companhia Mercantile Internacional (1921) 
9 LI.L.Rep 171 (C.A.) [171].  
34 Bridge M, et al, Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) at 19-
010.	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A fair question to ask is what benefit there is to regard the laytime and demurrage 
provision as one of indemnity rather than free and independent. It is necessary to 
point out that regardless of what one find to be most beneficial, it is the parties 
intentions which are predominant in the construction, save that it would provide more 
commercial common sense to follow the position which provides equal benefits for 
both parties if possible.   
Firstly, one would avoid the situation where a CIF buyer or FOB seller would be 
liable for demurrage under the sale contract and the counterparty is not liable due to a 
cesser clause, making no demurrage payable under the charterparty itself. The courts 
have described such a benefit or windfall as ‘unappealing’.35 The question if the law 
of penalty would aid the other party is further discussed in chapter 3.  
Secondly, it is not uncommon for the parties under a CIF contract to incorporate 
terms, which at the contracting time is unknown to one contracting party.36 If the 
precise rate of demurrage is unknown because the charterparty has not yet been drawn 
up, the situation would not be any different from the view of regarding the clause free 
and independent if it also incorporates a rate from the charterparty.   
Thirdly, the wording “As per charterparty” can be construed as not only referring to 
the rate but also to the amount actually payable under the charterparty, meaning 
antithetic that if no demurrage is payable under the charterparty, neither should any be 
payable under the sale contract. Even if the laytime and demurrage clause is seen as 
free and independent, one does not escape the fact that was admitted in The Devon, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Lord Justice Mance in Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd 
[2004] EWCA Civ 822 [32].   
36 Point made by Judge Rix in Ceval Alimentos S.A. v Agrimpex Trading Co. Ltd (The 
“Northern Progress” No. 2) [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 319 [327].   
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that the function of the liquidated damages is “a genuine pre-estimate of the 
recovering party’s exposure”.37 It would therefore seem that an isolated view of the 
laytime and demurrage clause would not easily be reconciled with the intentions of 
commercial parties so that one of the parties should cover the others expenses if they 
have not incurred any.  
This last remark goes to the very root of any reservation against regarding theses 
clauses as free and independent. The terminology demurrage is found in charterparties 
as liquidating damages due to exceeding the laytime agreed. If the same type of 
clauses operates in a different contractual environment, the same justifications for 
their existence is no longer valid, especially when no demurrage is payable under the 
charterparty. It can then be argued that these clauses have a different nature than their 
counterparts in charterparties, because they no longer relate to the liability for 
exceeding laytime at all.        
Nevertheless, the rationale in The Suzuki38 has not been greatly followed and the 
opposite conclusion has been drawn in several cases. The reasons for doing so has 
been that the relevant laytime an demurrage clause is followed by detailed provisions 
about notice of readiness and calculation of laytime39 or that a free standing provision 
provides certainty so that the parties will know where they stand.40 Another reason is 
the difficulties one has where there are several charterparties to choose a rate from.  
The case law does not provide consistency when it comes to the construction. This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[35].   
38	  Suzuki & Co. v Companhia Mercantile Internacional (1921) 9 LI.L.Rep 171 
(C.A.).	  
39 Gill & Duffus S.A. v Rionda Futures Ltd. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep. 67 [77].  
40 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[33-34].	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shown by the case of Gill & Duffus,41 where the same wording as used in The Suzuki42 
gave a different result. The laytime and demurrage clause was in Gill & Duffus not 
construed to be an indemnifying provision. This could stand for the proposition that 
the wording itself is not predominant as to the nature or that there has been a 
development in the authorities so that this wording itself is not enough to regard the 
provision as indemnifying. Following later authorities it seems evident that it is not 
possible to conclude on the nature of the clause merely by looking at the wording 
itself but that the context and references made to the charterparty43 must also be 
considered.   
One natural consequence of shifting the risk so that the laytime and demurrage clause 
is free and independent would be that the CIF buyer or FOB seller would be entitled 
to any despatch money if the clause so provides and the cargo has been loaded or 
discharged quicker than anticipated. The author has however not found any authority 
for this, but it would follow as a natural consequence of agreeing that the risk is on 
the other party, and thereby also the benefits should be attributable to the party.   
These justifications can be questioned as it has later been held that certainty in itself is 
not a principle, but “a desideratum and a very important one, particularly in 
commercial contracts. But it is not a principle and must give way to principle. 
Otherwise incoherence of principle is the likely result”.44 
One of the principles of construction which goes against construing the laytime and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Gill & Duffus S.A. v Rionda Futures Ltd. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep. 67. 
42 Suzuki & Co. v Companhia Mercantile Internacional (1921) 9 LI.L.Rep 171 (C.A.). 
43	  Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[42, iv].	  
44 Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha [2007] 2 WLR 691 
[38] by Lord Scott of Foscote.	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demurrage clause as free and independent is the fact that the wording of the clause 
often directly refers to the charterparty or incorporates the clause by the wording 
“Demurrage as per charterparty”.    
In the general law of contract, if a clause is ambiguous the wording will normally be 
construed against the party relying on it following the rule of contra proferentem.45 
The rule has seemingly not been applied to cases where one sets out to determine the 
nature of a laytime and demurrage clause in a sale contract. The reason for this might 
be that the clause itself is not perceived as ambiguous by the courts by construing the 
clause according to the intention of the parties.  
Another possibility is that the rule is less favourable following The Rainy Sky, where 
it was pointed out that if there is a possibility of more than two possible constructions 
“the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business 
common sense and to reject the other”.46 If the laytime and demurrage clause in sale 
contracts can be construed both as a free and independent clause and as indemnifying, 
one could ask which approach is most consistent with business common sense.  
Following the authorities cited above and the better view seems to be that it would 
make more business common sense to perceive the nature of a laytime and demurrage 
clause as free standing and independent because one then avoids the issues of 
discrepancies between the two sets of contracts and identifications issues. However, 
the freedom of contract principle still applies and “the weight to be given to the 
commercial consequences must depend on the degree of ambiguity of the language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See for instance Glynn v Margetson 1893 AC 351 where the principle was used in 
relation to a deviation clause in a charterparty.     
46 Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC in Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] 
UKSC 50 [21].	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concerned”.47 The construction of the laytime and demurrage clause will therefore 
depend on the context and wording used.   
2.3 The ‘default position’ 
Some authors have taken the view that the default position is that laytime and 
demurrage clauses in contracts of sale stand free and independent of their counterparts 
in the relevant charterparty.48 This can be supported by one of the highest authorities 
on the interpretation and construction of theses clauses in contracts of sale, which 
suggests that they are independent. In The Devon,49 the laytime and demurrage 
provisions in the contract of sale provided demurrage payable “As per charterparty 
per day pro-rata”.   
 
The dissenting Lord Justice Buxton favoured the position that their nature was one of 
indemnity. The reasoning adopted is based on the notion that the seller might incur 
expenses in performing the contract of carriage and they are therefore included in the 
sale contract, which “is the very essence of an indemnity”.50    
 
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the clause was an independent 
obligation and that only the rate was incorporated.51 It would therefore seem that the 
default position should be that these clauses are regarded as independent even if they 
refer to the charterparty as done in The Suzuki.52  Furthermore, the fact that there is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Judge Briggs in LB Re Financing No 3 Ltd v Excalibur Funding No 1 plc [2011] 
EWHC 2111 [46].  
48 Debattista C, Laytime and demurrage clauses in contracts of sale – links and 
connections 2003 LMCLQ 508 [508]. 
49 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822. 
50 [2004] EWCA Civ 822 [61].  
51 [2004] EWCA Civ 822 [43].  
52 Suzuki & Co. v Companhia Mercantile Internacional (1921) 9 LI.L.Rep 171 (C.A.). 
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only one reported case53 where the laytime and demurrage clause was held to act as an 
indemnity, strongly suggests that these clauses are to be regarded as free and 
independent from the outset, since there has been a shift from the authorities.    
  
However, this is only the conclusion of the case and the reasoning given by Lord 
Justice Mance shows that the process is not as straightforward as one might think. It 
would also seem that an argument based on scarce case law cannot evidence their 
nature in general as the clauses are drafted differently and the context varies in almost 
every case. There are several points, which must be made, as to the very nature of the 
laytime and demurrage clause in a sale contract.    
 
Firstly, it has been held that there is no presumption as to whether laytime and 
demurrage provisions are to be regarded as independent obligations in contracts of 
sale, but this is a question of construction itself54 which must be done against the 
factual matrix in each case.55 The better view seems therefore to be that the only 
meaning of “default position” is that the laytime and demurrage clause in the sale 
contract is, de facto, different from their counterparts in charterparties, being under a 
different contractual regime. One should therefore not approach the question of the 
nature of the laytime and demurrage clause by starting with any default position 
giving any presumption as to their nature. Their position and legal nature must be the 
product of their construction based on the principles set out in the authorities.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Suzuki & Co. v Companhia Mercantile Internacional (1921) 9 LI.L.Rep 171 (C.A.).	  
54 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[42] where Lord Justice Mance refers to this as a “general principle” and the case of 
Houlder Bros. v The Commissioners of Public Works [1908] A.C. 276.   
55 Glencore Energy (UK) Ltd v Sonol Israel Ltd [2011] EWHC 2756 (Comm) [13] 
and also pointed out in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich 
Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 as “the matrix of fact”.   
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It is therefore submitted that the starting point should be “neutral and free of pre-
conceptions or presumptions”56 and that the default position should take its basis in 
the principles of interpretation as set out in the Rainy Sky.57 This enables a skilled 
draftsman to provide a laytime and demurrage clause to act as a way of indemnity by 
the wording used, thereby showing the parties intentions.58 This can be clearly stated 
in the clause itself.   
  
Secondly, laytime and demurrage clauses nature and effect “depends upon the context 
and wording of the particular provisions, including the scope of any reference to or 
incorporation of the demurrage provisions of a charter-party”.59 In The Devon60 the 
reference “as per charterparty” did nothing more than to incorporate a rate, somewhat 
different from the earlier mentioned decision in The Suzuki.61 It would therefore seem 
that the wording does not itself provide the entire picture when it comes to the 
construction, and the context surrounding the charterparty and sale contract therefore 
becomes crucial.   
 
Summarised, the better view seems to be that the starting point is that laytime and 
demurrage clauses in contracts of sale are regarded as different clauses on the basis 
that they are under different contractual regimes. Their nature and effect must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Glencore Energy (UK) Ltd v Sonol Israel Ltd (The Team Anmaj) [2011] EWHC 
2756 (Comm) [18].  
57 Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50. 
58 Debattista C, Laytime and demurrage clauses in contracts of sale – links and 
connections 2003 LMCLQ 508 at 510. 
59 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[42, iv]. 
60 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822. 
61 Suzuki & Co. v Companhia Mercantile Internacional (1921) 9 LI.L.Rep 171 (C.A.).	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however be determined individually in each case based on the principles set out 
above. It is therefore submitted that there is no default position, albeit that laytime and 
demurrage provisions in a contract of sale are separate provisions from their 
counterparts in charterparties, being under a different contractual regime.  
 
2.4 Freedom and privity of contract principles  
The privity of contract principle is not only found when it comes to laytime and 
demurrage clauses, but it is a principle found in the general law of contract.62 The 
rights and obligations found within the four corners of the agreement are only 
between the parties to that specific contract and no one else. The implication being 
that an agreement between two parties can never regulate the right and obligations of 
a third party.  
 
One of the exceptions to this privity is the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999, but often this is exempted from applying to sale contracts.63 It would however 
seem difficult that a CIF buyer can rely on S. 6 (5) in the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 as to “avail himself of an exclusion or limitation of liability” in the 
carriage contract if the obligation to pay demurrage is regarded as free and 
independent under the sale contract. 
 
The next relevant principle is the freedom of contract principle. The principle stems 
from general law of contract and it can be seen as one of the reasons why English 
Law is favourable as governing law in commercial sales. The rights and obligations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v Selfridge & Co. Ltd [1915] AC 847.  
63 See here e.g. GAFTA 119, line 268-269.	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the parties are found within the four corners of the contract and nowhere else. In The 
Rainy Sky it was pointed out “Where the parties have used unambiguous language, the 
court must apply it”.64 In other words, the parties are free to agree to any terms as they 
may please, however as previously mentioned,65 if there are two possible 
constructions available the “the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is 
consistent with business common sense and to reject the other”.66 The freedom of 
contract principle can here be in conflict with construing the clause according to 
business common sense.    
 
In The Devon67 Lord Justice Mance found it useful to refer to authority for the notion 
that “there is no rule of law… preventing the parties making any bargains they may 
please”.68 This is one of the bases on which the judge concludes that the clauses are 
independent since the parties “may construct an independent scheme regarding 
demurrage”.69 The freedom of contract principle seem here to be favoured in contrast 
to the commercial sense argument which underlines the possibility of the seller to 
make a windfall profit if demurrage does not incur under the charterparty.70 It must be 
pointed out, that even if the freedom of contract principle exists, the principle itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC in Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] 
UKSC 50 [23]. 
65 See discussion above p. 16.  
66 Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC in Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] 
UKSC 50 [21] and Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v Salen Rederierna A.B. (“The 
Antaios No. 2”) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 235 [238].      
67 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[27].  
68 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[28], referring to Houlder Bros. v The Commissioners of Public Works [1908] A.C. 
276.  
69 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[33].   
70 Dissent of Lord Justice Buxton in Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation 
Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 [61].   
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cannot infer or to go against the notion that “the ultimate aim is to determine what the 
parties meant by the language used by ascertaining what a reasonable person would 
have understood the parties to have meant”.71 A construction of the laytime and 
demurrage clause based on the freedom of contract principle would therefore take a 
more literal interpretation than finding the intention of the parties through the factual 
matrix supported by business common sense.    
 
The better view seems to be that even if the parties enjoy freedom of contract, the 
proper construction of the agreement shall be based on a more holistic view, 
considering the language used as a reasonable person who has all the background 
knowledge would ascertain it and not use the principle as an argument for clauses if 
they do not make any commercial sense.    
 
Furthermore, if there is a cesser clause in the charterparty, one could argue that the 
liability for demurrage under the sale contract “flies in the face of commercial reality” 
so that it is unreasonable, the parties must make such an intention clear.72   
 
Another point must be made, which is that even though the parties enjoy freedom of 
contract, once one of the parties is obliged to pay liquidated damages even though 
there is no demurrage payable under the charterparty, it seem construed and without 
basis in reality to call such clauses for a demurrage clause when they in fact belong to 
the charterparty regime.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 [14]. 
72 See discussion above p. 13.	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3. Can the law of penalties prevent laytime and demurrage 
clauses to be independent? 
The law of penalties prohibits the use of pre-estimated anticipated loss, which is 
stipulated as in terrorem73 to the offending party and extravagant in comparison to the 
greatest loss that could follow from the breach.74 In other words, if the contract 
consists of a provision giving the other party a benefit, which is in great excess of the 
pre-estimated loss, the courts will strike out a clause that is based on deterring the 
other party from breaching the contract.    
 
In order to determine if the law of penalties has any effect on laytime and demurrage 
clauses in sale contracts, it is necessary to examine the very nature of these clauses 
and their purpose. The general purpose of a demurrage clause can be seen in two 
ways. It is both a pre-estimate of the loss that will occur if the vessel uses more time 
than prescribed and it gives the charterer a strong incentive not to exceed the 
stipulated laytime. This last observation fits strongly with the characterisation of 
being in terrorem as it is one of the main functions of a penalty clause. Whether the 
clause will be determined to be one or the other depends on the difference between 
the amount payable for the breach and the loss that might be sustained.75  
 
It would therefore seem that the law of penalties does little in terms of demurrage 
provisions in excess when it comes to charterparties since exceeding the laytime may 
result in loss of the next fixture, and therefore be of a considerable amount.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co. Ltd [1915] AC 79 
[86].  
74 Ibid. [87].  
75 Lordsvale Finance plc v Bank of Zamibia [1996] Q.B. 752 [762].	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One of the arguments put forward by Lord Justice Mance in The Devon76 for the 
clauses to be regarded as independent is that the general law of penalties “offers 
potential protection” for provisions without “a reasonable basis as a genuine pre-
estimate of the recovering party’s exposure”.77 It has been said that the CIF buyer 
continues to enjoy the protection the law affords against penalty clauses.78   
 
The argument itself seems to be based on the acceptance that the demurrage clause in 
the contract of sale is in fact used as a way of recovering costs under the charterparty. 
This leads somewhat reluctantly to the implication that it is an indemnifying 
provision, even though the judge concluded that it was indeed free and independent.  
 
The dissenting Lord Justice Buxton point out that it would seem a “sparse comfort” 
that the law of penalties would strike down such a clause as it being characterized as 
oppressive.79 Taking into account the nature of a demurrage clause, the question is if 
the law of penalty is able to strike down a demurrage clause at all. 
 
The market fluctuations relating to the pre-estimate of loss occurred and the 
calculation of demurrage is not relevant after the contract is concluded, as the clause 
is judged as of the making of the contract and not as the time of the breach.80 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822. 
77 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[35].   
78 Todd P, Laytime and demurrage provisions in sale contracts 2013 LMCLQ 150 
[154].  
79 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
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80 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co. Ltd [1915] AC 79 
[87].	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provides difficulty in our case as the sale contract may be concluded long before the 
terms of the charterparty. If the relevant time of assessing the clause is when the sale 
contract was entered into it might prove difficult to assess if the estimate of liquidated 
damages in the sale contract “is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage” when 
one does not know the actual demurrage payable under the charterparty.   
 
Consequently, the demurrage rate agreed at the time of entering the sale contract 
might seem to be a genuine pre-estimate at that time, but if there is a falling market, 
the difference between the loss and the rate might be significant. In other words, the 
law of penalties will not be able to assist a CIF buyer or FOB seller under a falling 
market because the assessment is made when the contract of sale is made and not 
later.  
 
Firstly, it would therefore appear that it is uncertain that the law of penalties can apply 
to a charterparty all the time it is fixed after the contract. Secondly, the safety net 
would seem inadequate as protection, when the threshold for applying the law of 
penalties to strike down a clause is high and narrow.81 It is therefore submitted that 
the CIF buyer or FOB seller would at best enjoy an uncertain and narrow protection 
from the law of penalties when it comes to laytime and demurrage clauses.  
 
The question arises if the law of penalties would give any protection if there was a 
cesser clause in the charterparty. Again, the time of assessing the clause is when the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Thomas D.R, Chuah J, The evolving law and practice of voyage charterparties; 
Laytime and Demurrage Clauses in Contracts of Sale – A Survey of the New York 
Society of Maritime Arbitrators’ Awards (1978 – 2008) and English Case Law 
(Informa Law, 2009) at page 174.   
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contract of sale was entered into. If the charterparty terms were not yet fixed, the 
parties would not have any knowledge about the charterparty at all and the cesser 
clause seems to fall outside the scope of the law of penalties since it is not a part of 
the factual matrix at the time of entering the contract. Consequently, the law of 
penalties gives the CIF buyer or FOB seller little to none comfort.  
 
It would therefore seem that if one is to regard a clause as independent of the 
charterparty it would seem difficult to hold the liquidated damages to be oppressive 
when one has nothing to compare with and the parties enjoy the freedom of contract. 
The better view seems therefore to be that the law of penalties argument in favour of 
the laytime and demurrage clause to be free and independent is of little value.  
 
3.1 The mirroring problem 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the difficulties that arise when one has a 
free-standing laytime and demurrage clause in the sale contract making cross-
reference to or incorporation from the charterparty. What implications do such 
references or incorporations have on their construction?   
 
In general a back-to-back drafting of an laytime and demurrage clause in the sale 
contract should encourage a construction, which is highly influenced by the 
charterparty terms since they are alike. The problems with generalization is that the 
laytime and demurrage clauses might be drafted slightly differently, both in the 
contract of sale and in the charterparty. It therefore makes more sense to set out 
general principles of interpretation of these clauses than to give any definite answer to 
their nature.       
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In The Team Anmaj82 the demurrage clause in the contract of sale set out that 
demurrage was payable “As per charterparty rate, terms and conditions” only 
incorporated a rate and did not provide an indemnifying provision when the sale 
contract contained also laytime provisions. Consequently, the demurrage claim from 
the seller was struck out as time-barred following S. 5 of the Limitation Act 1980 
because the cause of action accrued when discharge was completed and not when the 
invoice was given later on.  The case thereby followed the ratio given in The Devon83  
and Gill & Duffus84, that when a laytime provision also is included, the laytime and 
demurrage clause is not indemnifying.   
 
Mr Justice Beatson held that it clearly followed from authority that “where a sale 
contract incorporates the terms of a charterparty relating to demurrage in an otherwise 
independent sale contract containing, for example, provisions about laytime the 
obligation is generally to be construed as an independent demurrage obligation and 
not as an indemnity”.85 It therefore seems that the judge makes a general remark about 
these clauses when there is a laytime provision coupled with the demurrage clause in 
the sale contract. It seems therefore to be correct to call a laytime and demurrage 
clause free and independent when one also has a laytime provision in the sale 
contract. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Glencore Energy (UK) Ltd v Sonol Israel Ltd [2011] EWHC 2756 (Comm). 
83 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822. 
84 Gill & Duffus S.A. v Rionda Futures Ltd. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep. 67. 
85 Glencore Energy (UK) Ltd v Sonol Israel Ltd [2011] EWHC 2756 (Comm) [21].  
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However, it might be the parties’ intention to only provide the same laytime here as in 
the charterparty. How such a back-to-back arrangement can be seen as a sign of it 
being free and independent and not merely an indemnifying incorporation is more 
difficult to understand. The ratio can be followed from a viewpoint that if the 
demurrage clause also provides a laytime, it is more free and independent than if it 
merely provided for demurrage.  
 
A further point made by Mr Justice Beatson was that the commercial background or 
“factual matrix” has implications on the construction of the laytime and demurrage 
clauses as they must be interpreted against their commercial background.86 Thereby 
bearing in mind their function and purpose under the sale contract. This is also 
evident from the fact that it has been held that without any reference to the 
charterparty terms, the commencement of laytime under a sale contract is to count 
from the moment the goods are at the disposal of the buyer and thereby not reliant on 
the law of charterparties.87 The laytime is therefore seen as independent of the 
charterparty when no reference is made.88        
 
As the above authorities show, there are difficulties in construing laytime and 
demurrage clause even though they have a separate laytime provision when they refer 
to the charterparty and therefore should be regarded as free and independent. The CIF 
seller therefore has he following choices;  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Glencore Energy (UK) Ltd v Sonol Israel Ltd [2011] EWHC 2756 (Comm) [13.].  
87 Etablissements Soules et Cie v Intertradex S.A. [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 378 (C.A.).   
88 The position is different if there is an explicit reference to the charterparty terms, 
e.g. about notice of readiness as shown by Gill & Duffus S.A. v Rionda Futures Ltd. 
[1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 67 where the law on charterparties applied.	  	  	  	  
  Page 33 of 55 
i) incorporate or make reference to the charterparty rate of demurrage in the contract 
of sale, or ii) mirror the laytime and demurrage clause from the charterparty into the 
sale contract, if known (back-to-back) or iii) provide a cesser clause in the 
charterparty and a laytime and demurrage clause in the sale contract making the CIF 
buyer liable for demurrage, thereby making a potential profit.  
 
There are however a further possibility for the parties to make their intentions as clear 
as possible as to making the clause independently, a method which is shown in The 
Profindo.89    
4. A profound problem: The Profindo case  
A recent case demonstrating the difficulties and a possible solution with the drafting 
and understanding of these clauses is seen in The Profindo.90 The case concerned a 
sale contract concluded on CFR (Cost, freight) shipment terms. The port authorities 
obstructed the usage of laytime at the discharge port without any fault by the seller or 
the buyer.  
 
The main question before the High Court of Singapore was who was to bear the costs 
of such obstructions when the relevant laytime and demurrage clause in the sale 
contract did not regulate if the laytime was to be suspended or not. The case is of 
importance because the reasoning given can lead to CIF and CFR buyers always 
being liable for demurrage, the risk of delay being upon them.91  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Profindo Pte Ltd v Abani Trading Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 10.	  
90 Profindo Pte Ltd v Abani Trading Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 10. 
91 Todd P, Laytime and demurrage provisions in sale contracts, 2013 LMCLQ 150 at 
p. 153 
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In concluding that the buyer was to bear the risk and costs of such an interruption 
after laytime had commenced, the reasoning given by Judge Prakash was that if the 
physical duties for a CIF or CFR seller were not even “under any duty to ensure the 
actual physical delivery of the goods (…) it would be quite remarkable to hold that 
the risk of delay in unloading the goods at the port of discharge after laytime has 
commenced has to be borne by him”.92   
 
It appears that the reasoning is based on the general definition given for the duties of a 
CIF seller.93 However, the better view seems to be that the lack of a physical duty on 
one party cannot imply a duty on the other without having any contractual or legal 
foundation. A much stronger argument would be that the CIF buyer had undertaken to 
carry out the discharge operation94 and that any risk of delay in unloading the goods at 
port of discharge has to be borne by him and that the burden of persuasion as to show 
any agreed suspension is on him.  
  
It also follows from the author that Judge Prakash is citing, that the contract “may 
impose on him [CIF buyer] a duty to discharge the cargo at a specified rate; and 
failure to perform this duty will make him liable to the seller for any demurrage which 
the latter has to pay in consequence for the delay”,95 but this obligation must follow 
from contract.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Profindo Pte Ltd v Abani Trading Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 10 [25].  
93 Bridge M, et al, Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) para 
19-010.   
94 Profindo Pte Ltd v Abani Trading Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 10 [4]. 
95 Bridge M, et al, Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) para 
19-090 and Acada Chemicals Ltd v Empresa Nacional Pesquera SA [1994] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 428.     
  Page 35 of 55 
The case has been said to be a “landmark case” which will be highly persuasive for 
the UK courts96 on the issue of obstructions after laytime has commenced when this is 
not regulated in the contract.   
 
However, not all authors are of the opinion that the rationale of the case is to be 
followed as it has been criticised that Judge Prakash “is confusing entirely different 
types of risk (..) and it is not permissible to reason from CIF and CFR contracts 
generally”.97 The better view seems therefore to be that in case obstruction of laytime 
is not regulated by the sale contract itself by any exception clause, it should not be 
inferred that it always is the buyer who should bear the costs of any obstructions, but 
that the contractual terms must imply such a duty. The parties can therefore, similar to 
charterparties, provide an exception clause as to laytime.   
 
The basis taken in the physical duties of the seller, or rather the lack of such, in order 
to justify that the obligations of the buyer to bear the costs, seems to stretch the duties 
of a CIF buyer too far. The better view seems to be that such obligations must be 
expressed in the contract and that the parties should not rely upon any implied 
obligations through the courts’ interpretation, as this involves uncertainty. Another 
point is that the parties may have agreed different arrangements concerning the 
discharge process and that the obligation to discharge cannot be considered to be a 
general obligation for the CIF buyer.98       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Awofeso A, New laytime and demurrage considerations under sale contracts 
Shipping & Trade Law, 28 January 2013. 
97 Todd P, Laytime and demurrage provisions in sale contracts 2013 LMCLQ 150 at 
p. 153, however the author suggests that the court was correct in its interpretation “but 
not in its reasoning from risk transfer in CIF contracts”.    
98 Congimex Companhia Geral de Commercio Importadora e Exportadora S.A.R.L. v. 
Tradax Export S.A. [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 687.  
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Furthermore, the case supports and follows the rationale of The Devon99 by 
suggesting that the seller could have succeeded with a higher demurrage claim 
following the actual costs from the contract of sale rather than the amount actual 
payable to the shipowner.100 
 
In The Profindo, the judge concludes that “as a matter of law, it could have been 
argued” that the laytime and demurrage clause is free-standing and uses The Devon as 
authority.101 It must however be pointed out that the case makes the general notion 
that the question is one of construction102 and that there are several principles one 
must apply in order to determine that the “provision constitute an independent 
code”.103     
 
4.1 The Profindo method 
The method used in The Profindo for construing an independent laytime and 
demurrage clause in the contract of sale without incorporation from a charterparty has 
the advantage that the buyer knows where he stands.104 
 
However, one of the disadvantages is that the terms of the contract of sale might be 
concluded long before any charterparty is fixed. In a fluctuating market, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
99 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822. 
100 Profindo Pte Ltd v Abani Trading Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 10 [31]. 
101 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822 
[31]. 
102 [2004] EWCA Civ 822 [42].  
103 [2004] EWCA Civ 822 [43].  
104 Todd P, Laytime and demurrage provisions in sale contracts 2013 LMCLQ 150 
[152].	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consequence is that the CIF seller cannot be certain of the exact demurrage rate the 
shipowner under the charterparty will demand. The rate agreed can therefore be an 
overestimate, which gives the CIF seller a benefit or it might be an underestimate, 
which leaves the rest of the cost to be borne by the CIF seller since it is free standing.  
 
From the viewpoint of commercial common sense it would therefore seem to be more 
fair for both parties to follow the market fluctuations as they are at the time when the 
charterparty is entered into, and follow this rate rather than an hypothetical estimate 
of what the rate will be. The downside of this approach is that one faces the same 
problems as before and is back to square one when it comes to the construction and 
incorporation issues.  
 
The better view would therefore for the parties to develop and draft clauses similar to 
the one used in the Profindo case in order to make sure that the clause operate 
independently. One would then also be in need of providing a separate laytime 
provision in the sale contract, combined with an exception clause as to obstructions 
after laytime has commenced. Following the rationale given in The Handy Mariner105 
the law on charterparties should not apply if no reference is made to the charterparty. 
Consequently, the laytime and demurrage provision in the sale contract will be long 
and complex. However, the better view seems to be that the complexity is necessary 
to ensure that the clause is free and independent and to avoid the problems with their 
construction as shown in the above.     
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  Etablissements Soules et Cie v Intertradex S.A. [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 378 (C.A.).	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5. Laytime and demurrage in standard form sale contracts: 
FOSFA and GAFTA 
The commercial point of using a standard form contract is that it is efficient, provides 
certainty and often gives rules for how disputes are to be resolved under arbitration, 
often under its own trade tribunals. Several of these sale contracts have however no 
demurrage provisions at all, leaving the drafting of such clauses to the parties 
themselves. If the parties do not agree any laytime and demurrage provision, the 
situation would be as discussed below.106 Furthermore, the ones that does mention 
demurrage or discharge costs are often “surprisingly laconic about laytime and 
demurrage”.107     
 
Under FOSFA 54, the demurrage provision provides that the oil shall be discharged 
and the CIF buyer “shall take delivery with customary quick despatch after notice of 
readiness has been given by the shipowner”.108 If the buyer does not comply with this, 
they are “to be liable to pay demurrage at the rate stipulated in the Charter Party or 
Contract of Affreightment”. There are several issues that arise. 
 
Firstly, the parties have provided for a customary and not fixed provision regulating 
the discharge process. What implications does it have that a reasonable period is 
allowed for discharge under the sale contract if the charterparty provides a fixed 
laytime provision?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See Chapter 6.  
107 Debattista C, Laytime and demurrage clauses in contracts of sale – links and 
connections 2003 LMCLQ 508 [509]. 
108 Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Association Limited (FOSFA) 54, line 153.	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In an obiter dictum in The Happy Day,109 the view was expressed that under a FOSFA 
54 form “the liability of the buyer for demurrage is of course to the seller who may or 
may not be the charterer, and will usually be dependent upon whether or not the seller 
is himself liable”.110 Thereby it seems that the demurrage payable by the CIF buyer 
will actually depend if it is payable under the charterparty, making it resemble an 
indemnifying provision. It is however suggested that this obiter dictum should be read 
with some caution and that the general provision of FOSFA 54 provides only that the 
rate of demurrage should be the same as in the charterparty, therefore making it an 
independent and free-standing obligation.   
 
The most difficult assessment is however the wording “customary quick despatch” 
which regulates the discharging process. It has been suggested by some that the 
reason for this short approach is because the parties may agree more specific laytime 
and demurrage provisions in an exchange of letters or faxes.111 Even if the parties 
agree on specific terms outside the standard form, it can be questioned how effective 
this really is if the parties have to regulate the provision on every occasion of sale and 
the law on this issue is highly complex.  
 
The situation is somewhat different under FOSFA 53 which is concluded on FOB 
shipment terms. If the FOB seller fails to comply with the loading rate stipulated in 
the preamble or the average rate and “demurrage is thereby incurred he shall be liable 
to pay demurrage” at the rate in the preamble or “US $18,000 per day/pro rata, or as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Lord Justice Potter in Glencore Grain Ltd. V Flacker Shipping Ltd. (”The Happy 
Day”) [2002] EWCHA Civ 1068 [505].  
110 Ibid. [59].  
111 Debattista C, Laytime and demurrage clauses in contracts of sale – links and 
connections 2003 LMCLQ 508 [510].	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per Charter Party whichever is the lower”.112 The wording “thereby incurred” 
suggests that there actually has to be demurrage incurred under the charterparty, again 
the resemblance towards an indemnifying provision is present. This view will be 
strengthened if no demurrage is set out in the sale contract and the rate which is lower 
is found under the charterparty, thereby making the sale contract more dependent on 
the charterparty terms. There is however a qualification to the responsibility for the 
FOB seller if there is a delay over 72 hours and the delay is caused by  “any other 
reason for which the Sellers are not contractually responsible, any extra costs for 
Sellers shall be for Buyers’ account”.113 This exception must be seen as very widely 
drafted, meaning that the FOB seller is not responsible for costs due to obstructions 
resulting in delay, which are outside the control sphere of the FOB seller.       
 
In GAFTA 122114  and GAFTA 100 concluded on CIF shipment terms, the discharge 
provision115 provides that the discharge shall be “as fast as the vessel can deliver” and 
that “the costs of discharge from hold to ship’s rail shall be for Sellers’ account, from 
ship’s rail overboard for Buyers’ account. If documents are tendered which do not 
provide for discharging as above (…) Sellers shall be responsible to Buyers for all 
extra expenses incurred thereby”. It here seems that there is no demurrage agreed at 
all for the CIF buyer, following the last sentence providing that the CIF seller shall 
cover costs that the CIF buyer incurs if the discharge is not done correctly. It seems 
therefore that there is no obligation on the CIF buyer to be responsible for demurrage.     
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 FOSFA 53, lines 42-44.  
113 FOSFA 53, lines 45-46.  
114 Grain And Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) No. 122.  
115 GAFTA 122 cl. 13 and GAFTA 100 cl. 14. 	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This is in contrast to GAFTA 112 which provided the other extreme when it comes to 
length and precision.116 This standard form does not only provide specifics about the 
commencement of laytime, but also exceptions. However, the demurrage provision is 
quite short only referring to “Rate of demurrage as per Charter Party/Booking 
Note/Despatch half demurrage”.117 This must be taken as only incorporating the rate, 
as seen in the earlier mentioned cases, making it free and independent from the 
charterparty terms.  
 
In GAFTA 64 which is concluded on FOB shipment terms, simply states that the 
vessel is “to load in accordance with the custom of the port of loading unless 
otherwise stipulated”,118 thereby not giving any further guidance on any demurrage 
payable.   
 
Summarised, it seems evident that these standard forms vary in their length and 
complexity, some provide extensive laytime and demurrage provisions, while others 
provide close to none. The ones which lack to mention laytime and demurrage place a 
responsibility on the parties themselves to develop and incorporate a demurrage and 
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connections 2003 LMCLQ 508 [509]. 
117 GAFTA 112, lines 174-175.  
118 GAFTA 64 lines 49-50.	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6. No express laytime and demurrage clause in the sale 
contract: can implied obligations help the cost bearer? 
 
It has been pointed out that that it is difficult to see how a CIF seller can recover 
against the buyer for delay, due to the basis that the buyer owed him a duty to 
discharge with reasonable despatch or at a rate as specified in the charterparty.119 This 
follows from the notion that under a CIF contract there is no implied duty on the 
buyer to discharge the goods at all.120 It would therefore seem that the CIF seller 
cannot rely on any implied terms and is therefore forced to provide a separate laytime 
and demurrage clause in the sale contract, unless it is specified in the contract that the 
buyer must discharge at a given rate.  
 
The situation must be explained somewhat differently when it comes to the duties of a 
FOB seller as one of the duties is to deliver the goods free on board.121 The obligation 
has however not been suggested to extend so that the FOB seller must deliver within 
any specified laytime as to avoid the buyer’s potential liability for demurrage.122 In 
general, it would seem that a CIF seller or FOB buyer cannot rely on implied 
obligations for the other party in order to get any demurrage reimbursed without 
having an explicit provision in the sale contract to that effect.     
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Debattista C, Laytime and demurrage clauses in contracts of sale – links and 
connections 2003 LMCLQ 508 [511].  
120 Congimex v Tradax [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250 (C.A) and Lorenzon F, Baatz Y, 
C.I.F. and F.O.B. Contracts (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) [8-043].  
121 Wimble v Rosenberg [1913] 3 K.B. 743 and Debattista C, Laytime and demurrage 
clauses in contracts of sale – links and connections 2003 LMCLQ 508 [512].     
122 Ibid. [513].	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This question must be seen differently when the parties have incorporated the 
Incoterms 2010 Rules since they provide more specifically the parties’ obligations.         
6.1 CIF Incoterms® 2010 Rules  
There are several issues which arise if the parties have agreed to incorporate the 
Incoterms® Rules into the sale contract, here we are concerned on the implications in 
relation to making demurrage payable under the sale contract.   
 
If the contract is concluded on CIF Incoterms® 2010 shipment terms, the terms 
themselves do not specify which kind of contract of affreightment the seller must 
procure or on which terms specifically. It is however provided that “The contract of 
carriage must be made on usual terms at the seller’s expense (…)”.123 It is therefore 
suggested that these terms are not implied anymore, but are in effect a part of the 
contract between the parties, setting out their rights and obligations.   
 
There are two issues that arise. The first one is if the requirement of the contract of 
carriage to be “usual” has any restrictions on which kind of terms the charterparty is 
concluded upon. If the charterparty contains a cesser clause or a very high demurrage 
rate, would the charterparty then be concluded on “usual” terms? Or is the term only 
relevant towards elements in the charterparty, which directly affect the CIF buyer?  
 
If the charterparty contains a demurrage rate, which must be considered high 
compared to the market rate, it would seem that the only party suffering from such is 
the CIF seller himself under the charterparty. The situation is different if the sale 
contract incorporates the demurrage rate into the sale contract making it payable to 
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the CIF buyer as the charterparty then becomes a relevant component to the sale 
contract and the requirement of the charterparty to be usual also becomes relevant.      
 
The reference to usual terms in the Rules can be seen in a much wider scope as S. 32 
(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides that the seller must make a contract with 
the carrier which is “reasonable”. If he fails to do so, the seller will be at risk for the 
goods and responsible for any damages. The view has been put forward that 
Incoterms® 2010 Rules negates the effect of any reasonableness test provide by the 
Act because it favours what is “usual in the trade”.124 It is however submitted that 
these two provisions do not necessarily need to be in conflict, as what is common in 
the trade in most cases also would be reasonable and there is no known case law 
stating that these are to be understood as negating each others effect. It is submitted 
that the standard term in the Incoterms 2010 merely adopt and use the understanding 
of usual, which is found under the reasonableness test after S. 32 (2).125            
 
However, it must be clear that the Sale of Goods Act 1979 S. 32(2) deals with the 
carriage contract itself. It does not deal with the demurrage clause under the contracts 
of sale. The only imaginable implication of the section would therefore be if the sale 
contract contains an incorporation of the charterparty terms, and these terms are 
outside what can be defined as usual in the trade when it comes to laytime and 
demurrage clauses in sale contracts. One possible alternative would be the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Geofizika DD v MMB Int Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 459 and Lorenzon F, Baatz Y, 
C.I.F. and F.O.B. Contracts (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) [2-031]. See however 
Lorenzon F, When is a CIF seller’s carriage contract unreasonable? – section 32(2) 
of the Sales of Goods Act 1979 2007 13 JIML 241 [250 - 251] where the opposite 
view seems to be taken.      
125 Lorenzon F, When is a CIF seller’s carriage contract unreasonable? – section 
32(2) of the Sales of Goods Act 1979 2007 13 JIML 241 [244].     
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incorporation of demurrage terms making the CIF buyer liable also for exceeding the 
laytime in the loading operation. Another possibility is found if the provision refers to 
demurrage payable “as per charterparty” and the relevant charterparty contains a 
cesser clause, protecting the CIF seller as charterer. It would seem that in such a case 
the relevant provision would not pass the reasonable test under S. 32(2).  
Firstly, it is the CIF seller that traditionally must procure a contract of 
affreightment,126 thereby also bearing the risks and costs in relation to the 
charterparty. Secondly, there is no implied obligation of the CIF buyer to discharge 
the goods if not set out in the contract of sale itself.127     
 
The second question is the meaning of the standard terms which provide that the 
carriage contract is for the “seller’s expense”. Taking into consideration that it is the 
carriage contract the terms have in mind it would seem that all the costs under the 
carriage contract is to be borne by the CIF seller. If this is true, it is able to be in 
conflict with any demurrage provision provided by the parties in the sale contract. 
This point is also supported by the view put forward in The Devon that even if the 
provision is not regarded as indemnifying, the “underlying rationale of the inclusion 
of any laytime and demurrage provision (…) is that the seller will have to arrange 
carriage on terms which may expose the seller to liability for demurrage to a 
shipowner or other third party”.128 Consequently, it would seem that even if the 
demurrage scheme is regarded as independently it is able to be in conflict with the 
charterparty because of this underlying rationale.         
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Johnson v Taylor Bros [1920] A.C. 144.  
127 Congimex Companhia Geral de Comercia Importadora e Exportadora Sárl v 
Tradax Export SA [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 250 C.A.  
128 [2004] EWCA Civ 822 [33]. 	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Furthermore, it follows from the shipment terms that the CIF buyer must pay  
“all costs and charges relating to the goods while in transit until their arrival at the 
port of destination, unless such costs and charges were for the seller’s account under 
the contract of carriage”129. It would therefore seem that the parties, according to the 
standard terms, have agreed that any costs arising from the charterparty are for the 
CIF seller to bear, such as demurrage.  
 
One must however bear in mind that if the parties have agreed that demurrage is to be 
borne by the CIF buyer at the port of discharge under the sale contract, the provision 
must be regarded as special terms which must prevail if no hierarchy clause is 
provided for.130 The parties have in other words agreed to amend the Rules ans 
specifically stipulated the costs of demurrage. This possibility follows from the 
freedom of contract principle and also by the Rules themselves by providing that “If 
the seller incurs costs under its contract of carriage related to unloading at the 
specified point at the port of destination, the seller is not entitled to recover such costs 
from the buyer unless otherwise agreed between the parties”.131   
 
It also follows from the Sale of Good Act 1979 S. 55(1) that the requirement of 
reasonableness found in S. 32 (2) “may be negative or varied by express 
agreement”.132 In addition, the CIF seller may still be under an obligation to pay 
demurrage under the contract of carriage. In other words, the contract of carriage is 
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130 Indian Oil Corporation v Vanol Inc. [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 634. 
131 Preamble to Incoterms® 2010 CIF.  
132 Lorenzon F, When is a CIF seller’s carriage contract unreasonable? – section 
32(2) of the Sales of Goods Act 1979 2007 13 JIML 241 [249] where exemplified as 
to ‘on or below deck’.       
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still for the “seller’s expense” using a literal interpretation even if there is an 
independent demurrage scheme under the sale contract.      
 
Taking these observations into account, it is submitted that the parties are free to 
agree and amend any terms as they would like and a laytime and demurrage clause in 
the sale contract would not to be in conflict with the Incoterms® 2010 or the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979. This will however depend on the drafting of the clause, and as 
suggested, there might be cases where the terms of the carriage contract are no longer 
considered to be on “usual terms”. There is however no possibility to imply that the 
CIF buyer is to bear demurrage costs under Incoterms® 2010, unless expressed in the 
contract itself.     
7. Conclusion 
As the above has shown, the drafting and construction of laytime and demurrage 
clauses in sale contracts is not straightforward and it seems than the only default 
position is that laytime and demurrage clauses in sale contracts belong to a different 
contractual regime than their counterparts under the charterparty. The principles of 
construction as set out in The Devon133 are noteworthy and provide guiding principles 
on how these clauses are to be construed, together with the principles of construction 
in The Rainy Sky.134   
 
In addition, the development in the authorities show that a laytime and demurrage 
clause will generally be construed as free and independent where it is accompanied by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Fal Oil Co. Ltd. v Petronas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd [2004] EWCA Civ 822.	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  Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50. 
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a laytime provision, thereby making it able to stand on its own feet. It is therefore 
submitted that parties seeking to have a laytime and demurrage clause in the sale 
contract, which should function as an indemnifying provision, must state so expressly 
in the contract of sale. If the laytime and demurrage clause in the sale contract is free 
and independent, the parties cannot rely on any exceptions as to laytime under the 
charterparty, unless stated so expressly.    
 
It is also submitted that the law of penalties provide little to no protection for the CIF 
buyer or FOB seller if there is a cesser clause in the charterparty, because the 
threshold for striking down a clause is set very high by the authorities. It would 
therefore be uncertain for a CIF buyer or FOB seller to rely on the mere possibility 
that the courts will strike down the laytime and demurrage clause in such a case.  
 
Furthermore, the best method for ensuring that the provision will be construed as free 
and independent would be by using The Profindo135 method, by drafting a laytime and 
demurrage clause in the sale contract, which operates without any reference to the 
charterparty and by providing its own demurrage rate. This method would also seem 
to provide most clarity from the other alternatives. It should however be noted that the 
laytime provision needs to be more developed than in the mentioned case so that the 
parties have clarity and know their right and obligations under the contract of sale.  
 
The parties under a sale contract which seeks to have an independent laytime and 
demurrage clause must also consider the implications the charterparty has to the 
commencement of laytime and exceptions. The draftsmen of the sale contract is here 
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faced with a dilemma. One could make laytime and demurrage clauses in sale 
contract more complex by expanding the clause with commencement of laytime and 
incorporate any exceptions that should apply, but that would also be an argument for 
not regarding the clause as independent anymore by strengthening the ties to the 
charterparty itself. Or the alternative would preferably be to adopt an individual and 
specific laytime and demurrage clause that does not refer to the charterparty at all.   
 
As shown in the above, the law on laytime and demurrage clauses in sale contracts is 
highly complex and the right and obligations for the parties can be uncertain, 
providing a difficult situation for the parties in the process of negotiation the terms of 
the sale contract. Depending on how the sale contract is drafted, this will be 
predominant for the drafting of any other sale contracts in a string sale so that the 
expenses for demurrage is covered further down the line.  
 
In the view of the author, a fair assumption is that the length and complexity of 
laytime and demurrage clauses in sale contracts will increase in the future. Thereby 
developing the law for laytime and demurrage clauses in sale contracts. This view is 
based on the many uncertainties as shown in the above and the parties’ desire to 
provide certainty when it comes to financial liability in a difficult and all time low 
freight market.   
 
Even though the understanding of these clause is complex and much depend on their 
wording and context, the single most important point is to make the parties to the sale 
contract aware of this uncertainty so that they are able to make enlightened choices 
when drafting the laytime and demurrage provision before any dispute arise.  
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